Making new connections towards cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game /

Evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game is studied where initially all players are linked via a regular graph, having four neighbors each. Simultaneously with the strategy evolution, players are allowed to make new connections and thus permanently extend their neighborhoods, pro...

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Main Authors: Szolnoki, Attila. (Author), Perc, Matjaž. (Author), Danku, Zsusza. (Author)
Format: Book Chapter
Jezik:English
Teme:
Sorodne knjige/članki:Vsebovano v: Europhysics letters
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024 7 1 |a 10.1209/0295-5075/84/50007  |2 doi 
040 |a KTFMB  |b slv  |c SI-MaIIZ  |d KTFMB  |e ppiak 
041 0 |a eng  |b eng 
080 |a 530.16 
100 1 |a Szolnoki, Attila.   |4 aut 
245 0 0 |a Making new connections towards cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game /   |c A. Szolnoki, M. Perc and Z. Danku.  
300 |a str. 50007-1-50007-6. 
504 |a Abstract.  
520 |a Evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game is studied where initially all players are linked via a regular graph, having four neighbors each. Simultaneously with the strategy evolution, players are allowed to make new connections and thus permanently extend their neighborhoods, provided they have been successful in passing their strategy to the opponents. We show that this simple coevolutionary rule shifts the survival barrier of cooperators towards high temptations to defect and results in highly heterogeneous interaction networks with an exponential fit best characterizing their degree distributions. In particular, there exist an optimal maximal degree for the promotion of cooperation, warranting the best exchange of information between influential players. 
653 0 |a evolucijska teorija iger  |a dilema zapornika  |a prostorske igre  |a koevolucija 
653 0 |a evolutionary game theory  |a prisoner's dilemma  |a spatial games  |a coevolution 
700 1 2 |a Perc, Matjaž.   |4 aut 
700 1 2 |a Danku, Zsusza.   |4 aut 
773 0 |t Europhysics letters  |d Les Ulis : Les Ed. de physique, 1986-  |x 0295-5075  |g Vol. 84 (2008), str. 50007-1-50007-6