Tri poti G. E. Moora /
Obravnovam strategijo obrambe vsakdanje vednosti in odgovora skeptika G. E. Moora, ki nastopa v njegovih sestavkih "Dokaz zunanjega sveta", "Gotovost" in "Štiri oblike skepticizma". Ta strategija ima vsaj dve težavi. Prva je v tem, da Moore ne pojasni intuitivne moči in...
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| Format: | Book Chapter |
| Jezik: | Slovenian |
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| Sorodne knjige/članki: | Vsebovano v:
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| Izvleček: | Obravnovam strategijo obrambe vsakdanje vednosti in odgovora skeptika G. E. Moora, ki nastopa v njegovih sestavkih "Dokaz zunanjega sveta", "Gotovost" in "Štiri oblike skepticizma". Ta strategija ima vsaj dve težavi. Prva je v tem, da Moore ne pojasni intuitivne moči in privlačnosti skeptičnega argumenta in svoje rešitve ne podgradi s teorijo vednosti. Druga pa je ta, da Moorov dokaz šteje kot klasični primer zmote petitio principii. Trije obravnavani članki se zaključijo s tremi med seboj različnimi predlogi odgovora skeptiku, ki jih lahko shematsko povzamemo z naslednjimi tezami: (j) imamo evidenco, s katero lahko zavrnemo skeptično hipotezo ("Gotovost"); (ii) premise skeptičnega argumenta so mnogo manj prepričljive od zanikanja njegovego sklepa ("Štiri oblike skepticizma") in (ii) premise Moorovego dokaza so nekaj, kar vemo, četudi jih ne moremo dokozati ("Dokaz zunanjega sveta"). Vsaka od strategij ima svojega sodobnega zagovornika ali vsaj nadaljevalca (i - Sosa; ii -Lycan; iii - Pryor). Ker je Moorov dokaz povezan z analizo zmote krožnego sklepanja, obravnovam tudi pojem argumenta in problem prenosa jamstev v prepričljivem argumentu (Wright). Struktura dialektične situacije med skeptikom in njegovim nosprotnikom je takšna, da glede na pravilo argumentativne igre skeptika ne moremo zovrniti. Toda v ozadju zmote krožnega sklepanja je neka dvoumnost: dialektično nopako v igri argumentiranja in epistemološko zmotno sklepanja iz premis, ki so manj znane od sklepa. Dialektični neuspeh Moorovego dokaza ne pomeni nujno epistemološkega neuspeha. A Moorean defense of common-sense knowledge and his strategy of refutig skepficism as presented in his "Proof of an External world", "(certainty" and "Four forms of skepticism" is analyzed. Two difficulties are exposed: Moore does not explain the intuitive strength of skeptical arguments ond does not base his refutafions on a developed theory of knowledge. And secondly, Moore's proof is often presented as a classical example of begging the question. Three articles end with three different responses to the skeptic: (i) we do possess evidence to refute the skeptical hypothesis - "Certainty"; (ii) the premises of the skeptical argument are much less convincing then its conclusion - "Four forms of skepticism"; (iii) the premises of Moore's argument are something he can know without being able to prove - "Proof of an External world." Each of the strategies has been defended in contemporary Neo-moorean epistemology (i - Sosa; ii - Lycon; iii - Pryor). Since Moore's proof is connected with the problem of begging the question, the concept of argument and the problem of transmission of warrant (Wright) is also analyzed. The structure of dialectical situation is such that the skeptic can not be refuted in the "game of argumentation." But there is an old ambiguity in the fallacy of "begging the question" - the fallacy can be understood in the context of a dialogue, when one wins by relying on the opponent's granting the point ot issue. And there is the epistemological fallacy of an "attempt to prove what is not self-evident by means of itself" (Aristotle ). Rhetorical deficiency of Moore's proof does imply its epistemological deficiency. |
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| Fizični opis: | str. 23-43. |
| Bibliografija: | Bibliografija: str. 42-43. Povzetek ; Abstract. |
| ISSN: | 1408-2969 |