Effectiveness of conditional punishment for the evolution of public cooperation /
Collective actions, from city marathons to labor strikes, are often mass-driven and subject to the snowball effect. Motivated by this, we study evolutionary advantages of conditional punishment in the spatial public goods game. Unlike unconditional punishers who always impose the same fines on defec...
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Main Authors: | , |
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Format: | Book Chapter |
Jezik: | English |
Teme: | |
Sorodne knjige/članki: | Vsebovano v:
Journal of theoretical biology |
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