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Stability of cooperation under image scoring in group interactions

Image scoring sustains cooperation in the repeated two-player prisoner's dilemma through indirect reciprocity, even though defection is the uniquely dominant selfish behaviour in the one-shot game. Many real-world dilemma situations, however, firstly, take place in groups and, secondly, lack th...

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Bibliografske podrobnosti
Main Authors: Nax, Heinrich H. (Author), Perc, Matjaž. (Author), Szolnoki, Attila. (Author), Helbing, Dirk. (Author)
Format: Book Chapter
Jezik:English
Teme:
javne dobrine > skupinske interakcije > fazni prehod > socialna dilema > fizika socioloških sistemov
public goods > group interactions > phase transition > social dilemma > physics of social systems
Sorodne knjige/članki:Vsebovano v: Scientific reports
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